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III. Report on Hague Rules Relating
to Bills of Lading
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports rat-
ification by the United States of the 1968 Protocol ("Visby Amend-
ments"), adopted by diplomatic conference in Brussels, Belgium, to the
1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to Bills of Lading ("Hague Rules"), ratified by the United States
in 1937, and the 1979 Protocol (SDR Amendments) to the 1924 Convention
as amended by the 1968 Protocol.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
requests that the United States Government consider further changes in
the Hague/Visby Rules such as:
(a) Adopting the limits of liability set forth in the proposed 1980 U.N.
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods of ap-
proximately $1160 per package or approximately $3.50 per kilo;
(b) Eliminating the "nautical fault" defense by which a carrier can
avoid liability by blaming his servants or agents for negligence in
the navigation or management of the vessel;
(c) Providing for imposition of liability in multimodal movements when
the carrier on which the loss or damage occurred cannot be readily
identified, and
(d) Clarifying that stevedores are entitled to the same liability limits as
carriers.
Report Re International Conventions
on Ocean Shipping
I. Introduction and Summary
This Report, prepared by the Section of International Law and Practice,
pertains to the maritime law governing shipowner liability in the event of
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loss or damage to cargo. For the past fifty years, this liability has been
governed by the 1924 Hague Rules, which were ratified by the United
States in 1937 and implemented into U.S. statutory law by way of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 U.S.C. 1300 et seq.). In an attempt to
modernize the Hague Rules, a Protocol was adopted by diplomatic con-
ference in 1968. Known colloquially as the "Visby Amendments," this
Protocol has been ratified by approximately twenty-four nations (but not
by the United States) and is presently in force. In 1978 and 1980, two
additional Conventions were adopted the U.N. Convention on the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea, colloquially known as the "Hamburg Rules," and
the U.N. Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods,
colloquially known as the "Multimodal Convention." The Hamburg Rules
were designed to replace both the Hague Rules and the Visby Amend-
ments, while the Multimodal Convention was designed to resolve liability
problems arising out of the increasing use of containers in door-to-door
international shipments using several transports modes. Neither the Ham-
burg Rules nor the Multimodal Convention (so far ratified respectively
by only eleven and four countries-none from Western Europe or North
America) is presently in force. This Report analyzes the various Con-
ventions and recommends a course of action which, it is believed, is both
attainable and in the overall interests of all concerned parties.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS:
(1) that the Visby Amendments should be ratified promptly;
(2) that the United States Government should, in addition, consider four
further changes in the Hague/Visby regime.
II. Historical Background
The general maritime law relating to carriage of goods is of ancient
origin. Even as applied today in our Federal Courts, there are concepts
such as general average' which date back to the Island of Thodes in
classical times. Traditionally, through Roman law, the Middle Ages with
its "law merchant," the laws of Visby, of Oleron and the Hansa Cities,
the merchant and the shipowner each shared in the dangers, the voyage
being considered a common adventure. Merchants accompanied their
goods on board. The shipowner was bound to furnish a seaworthy vessel
and a competent crew, but if the vessel was lost due to perils and dangers
of the sea, shipowner and merchant suffered together.
1. General Average is pro rata sharing of losses between a ship and her cargo where
there has been a sacrifice of property (of cargo or ship) to save the ship and cargo from a
common peril. (GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 2d ed. 1975, p. 244.)
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By the 18th Century, the bill of lading had been introduced into com-
merce. It served a threefold purpose: a receipt for the goods, a document
of title, and a contract of carriage. In this latter capacity, shipowners
began to put exemptions from liability into their bills of lading. 2 The Courts
generally held two types to be against public policy, one a reduction of
the warranty of seaworthiness, the other an exemption from the carrier's
own negligence.
THE HARTER ACT
In 1893 Congress enacted the first of the statutes regulating what was
to be put into bills of lading. 3 It forbade the two types of exemptions
already held to be against public policy, and added a compromise third
section excusing the carrier from errors in navigation or in management
of the ship provided it exercised due diligence before the voyage to make
the vessel in all respects seaworthy. This was followed by about thirty
years of instability, during which the law relating to shipments to or from
the United States differed from that in most other parts of the world. A
movement for "uniformity" developed, and an anti-international asso-
ciation of maritime lawyers, the Committee Maritime International, in
culmination of this movement, drafted a set of rules based upon the Harter
Act theory at a conference at the Hague in 1921.
III. The Relevant Conventions
A. THE HAGUE RULES
Ratified by the United States in 1937, the Hague Rules is one of the
most widely ratified treaties in private international law. Together with its
U.S. implementing legislation, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46
U.S.C. § 1300 et seq.), it sets out the bases for shipowner liability to
cargo; precludes contractual exemptions of liability on the part of shi-
powners; provides shipowners with various (i.e., seventeen) specified
defenses to liability; and establishes a limit on the shipowner's liability
of $500 per package or customary freight unit.
B. THE VISBY AMENDMENTS
In 1968, largely in response to the emergence of containerization in
ocean transportation, a diplomatic conference, convened in Brussels, Bel-
2. These exemptions could be very extensive indeed, including things like thieves, heat,
leakage, breakage, frost, decay, rust-regardless of fault.
3. The Harter Act, 46, U.S. Code 190-196.
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gium, adopted a Protocol to amend certain provisions of the Hague Rules.
Known as the "Visby Amendments," this Protocol has two principal
features. First, it increases the per package limit from $500 to an amount
that is now approximately $840 and, in addition, adopts an alternative
weight limit of approximately $2.50/kilo. 4 A shipper is entitled to invoke
either the per package or the per pound limit, whichever produces a higher
recovery. Second, it adopts a so-called "container clause" to make certain
that each individual package packed in a container-and not the container
and all its contents collectively-is considered a package for purposes of
the $840 per package limitation. To take advantage of the benefits of this
container clause, all a shipper need do is enumerate on his bill of lading
the number of packages or units packed in the container.
In other respects, the Visby Amendments do not change the Hague
Rules, preserving the general scheme of liability and the carrier's sev-
enteen specified defenses. The Visby Amendments entered into force on
June 23, 1977, but not for trade to or from the United States.
C. THE HAMBURG RULES
In 1978, in response to calls that the Hague Rules and Visby Amend-
ments should be substantially modernized, a diplomatic conference, con-
vened in Hamburg, Germany, adopted the "Hamburg Rules." Comprised
of thirty-four detailed articles, these Rules are designed to replace entirely
the system established under the Hague Rules and Visby Amendments
by inter alia: (1) creating a presumption of carrier negligence in the event
of damage to goods; and (2) eliminating specific reference to most of the
seventeen defenses, including the defense that exonerates a shipowner
from liability when damage to the cargo is caused by the negligence of
the carrier's servants or agents "in the navigation or in the management
of the ship." This so-called "nautical fault" defense, adopted in trans-
portation law conventions during the early part of the century, has been
a continuing source of sharp criticism by shippers throughout the world.
In addition, the Hamburg Rules increase the limits of liability to ap-
proximately $1,050 per package or, alternatively (at the shipper's option),
$3.15 per kilo. Only eleven countries (none from Western Europe or North
America) are so far parties to the Hamburg Rules. As adherence by twenty
countries is required to bring the Hamburg Rules into effect, it may be
several years, if then, before that occurs.
4. As the exact limit is expressed in the IMF's SDR unit of account, and fluctuates
depending on the value of the five currencies in the IMF's basket. The amounts set out
above represent the approximate values as of May 1, 1987.
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D. THE MULTIMODAL CONVENTION
The "Multimodal Convention," adopted in 1980, is intended principally
to deal with the advent of multimodal door-to-door container shipping
practices and to provide for adequate compensation in cases where dam-
age occurs but the transport mode on which it occurred cannot be de-
termined. So far as concerns terms of liability, the Multimodal Convention
basically adopts the same approach as the Hamburg Rules. In addition,
it allows for the creation of a new entity, called a Multimodal Transport
Operator (MTO), which could offer to shippers, at their option, a through
bill of lading with a door-to-door system of liability.
The Multimodal Convention establishes limits of liability of approxi-
mately $1,160 per package or, alternatively, $3.50 per kilo. These limits,
which are about 10% higher than the limits in Hamburg, apply in all
instances where either (a) the mode on which the damage occurred cannot
be determined; or (b) the mode on which the damage occurred can be
determined and the limits under that mode are lower than those under
the Multimodal Convention. Under the Multimodal Convention, shippers
would bring their claims (and lawsuits) against the Multimodal Operator
(MTO) who, in turn, could bring a subrogation action against the under-
lying actual carrier.
Thirty states must adhere to the Multimodal Convention to bring it into
force. As of May 1986, only four states had adhered. As with the Hamburg
Rules, therefore, it may be years before the Multimodal Convention enters
into force.
IV. The Views of the Various Interested Parties
The United States Government signed both the Visby Amendments and
the Hamburg Rules, but has not yet recommended either to the Senate
for its advice and consent. Because shipowners and cargo underwriters
support Visby but not Hamburg, while shippers largely support Hamburg
but not Visby, the United States recently suggested a potentially accept-
able compromise, contemplating the ratification of both Visby and Ham-
burg in stages. Known colloquially as the "trigger approach," the
Government's suggestion was that a package arrangement should be trans-
mitted to the Senate requesting its advice and consent to the ratification
of both Visby and Hamburg. The package would contemplate immediate
effectiveness of Visby, but delayed effectiveness of Visby, but delayed
effectiveness of Hamburg until, and triggered upon, the ratification of
Hamburg by a substantial number of countries which are trading partners
of the United States.
The Shipowners support immediate ratification of Visby, but oppose
both Hamburg and the trigger. While acknowledging that the Hague Rules
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are in certain respects dated (e.g., the defense of "nautical fault"), the
shipowners state that: the potential for losing customers because of bad
claims experience is itself an incentive to avoid loss and damage claims,
and no further incentive is added by Hamburg; the "nautical fault" de-
fense navigation, as a practical matter, seldom comes into play in their
claims experience (especially as container operators); and, finally, a work-
able, balanced and generally acceptable system has developed over the
fifty-year history of the Hague Rules and COGSA, which the shipowners
do not wish to see replaced by a totally new and wholly untested system
(i.e., Hamburg). They are concerned that adopting Hamburg would sub-
stantially disrupt the fifty-year old now established balance between in-
surer, shipper, and carrier interests, but produce no corresponding benefits.
The shipowners do not support the trigger approach, as they believe
such support would be interpreted as support for Hamburg. They are
prepared, however, to accept limits of liability higher than Visby or Ham-
burg plus the elimination of the "nautical fault" defense-but only so
long as most other major ship owning countries also do so, thus assuring
that all major ship-owning countries and their carriers would enjoy com-
petitive equality in the context of claims exposure.
The Cargo Underwriters are those who insure shippers. Like the ship-
owners, they also support ratification of Visby, but oppose both Hamburg
and the trigger. They state that the U.S. Courts, by way of decisions over
the past twenty years, have for the most part brought U.S. law fully up
to date with container technology, and that it is, therefore, unnecessary
to change the legal regime at all. They are prepared to ratify Visby,
however, as its provisions more or less reflect current U.S. law. As for
Hamburg, they state that its ratification would cause a "generation" of
totally unnecessary, wasteful litigation that would serve no useful purpose
except to support some segments of the admiralty bar.
The cargo underwriters vigorously denied the accusation (repeatedly
advanced by shipper interests) that the principal reason for their oppo-
sition to Hamburg was their fear of losing cargo underwriting business
once Hamburg transferred (as shippers believe will occur) the principal
burden of liability from shippers to carriers. In other words, many shippers
argue, if carriers and their insurers become principally responsible for
liability under Hamburg, there will be a decreasing need, and hence de-
creasing business opportunities, for cargo underwriters. The cargo un-
derwriters respond to this criticism by countering that Hamburg does not
transfer all liability to carriers; that even with Hamburg, shippers will
wish to take out cargo insurance (i.e., to cover origin-to-destination lia-
bility and risks that may not be covered by Hamburg); that most of the
seventeen Hague Rules/COGSA defenses are included "by implication"
in Hamburg (a proposition with which shippers do not totally disagree);
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that cargo insurance will accordingly still be an essential ingredient in the
majority of ocean shipments; and that their reason for opposing Hamburg
is, therefore, not self-serving but rather supportive of their clients' best
interests in trying to avoid the enormous expenses incident to adopting
any new system much less one that is as complex as Hamburg.
Shippers generally support Hamburg, the trigger (provided it triggers
automatically within two years), and the Multimodal Convention, but
oppose Visby, stating that they would prefer to maintain the status quo
even for several years awaiting Hamburg, rather than ratify Visby now.
By supporting Hamburg and the trigger, shippers believe the U.S. will be
sending a signal to our trading partners that we will become a party to
Hamburg once a sufficient number of them do so first.
Viewing the matter, as the shippers say, from the long rather than short
term, they believe that good service and professional handling by carriers
is most important and that Hamburg is far more of an incentive toward
such a goal than Visby. Even if freight rates modestly rise because of
Hamburg, and even if Hamburg does produce some new litigation, ship-
pers believe this is the "price of progress." They point to Hague's "nau-
tical fault" defense and Visby's modest monetary increases in liability
limits and argue that both are anachronistic and must be modernized
promptly, not in the distant future.
On the other hand, certain shippers admit that Hamburg may well not
bring about any "truly dramatic" changes; that other than the "nautical
fault" defense, most of the remaining sixteen defenses of Hague Rules/
COGSA may well be implied in Hamburg; and that preserving a Hague
Rules/COGSA type balance (requiring shippers independently to insure
their shipments) probably works in certain instances to encourage ship-
pers into better packaging than would be true if carrier liability were
substantially higher and/or exclusive. It should also be noted that at least
one shipper, Exxon Corporation, opposes Hamburg and supports the
ratification only of Visby.
The Stevedores' position is known to a certain extent. Under Herd v.
Krawill, 359 U.S. 297 (1959), stevedores were largely deprived of the
right, absent appropriate language in the bill of lading, to invoke or oth-
erwise rely upon the carrier's right to limit liability. However, some lower
federal court decisions since Herd have worked to restore the stevedore's
ability to invoke the limitation. The situation under U.S. law is thus
evolving. The stevedores oppose Visby because one of its provisions (i.e.,
Article 4bis (2)) may be construed as supporting Herd and denying their
right to limitation at least where they are "independent contractors."
Hamburg, on the other hand, appears to allow them to enjoy the right of
limitation.
The position of the U.S. Maritime Law Association (USMLA) is gen-
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erally opposed both to Hamburg and Hague but supports prompt ratifi-
cation of Visby. MLA is also supportive of further improvement in the
Hague/Visby system that would work to advantage of U.S. merchant
marine and to ocean carriage of good generally.
V. How the International Section Reached Its Position
By action of the Private International Law Committee, a Subcommittee
was appointed in May 1985 to study and report on whether the United
States should ratify the so-called 1968 Visby Amendments (to the 1924
Hague Rules), the 1978 Hamburg Rules, the 1980 Multimodal Convention,
any, all, or none. These questions have been facing the U.S. maritime
community and the U.S. Government for many years. During those years,
there has been much controversy, but no resolution as to what action
should be taken. The Subcommittee was chaired by Allan I. Mendelsohn.
From 1963-1968, Mr. Mendelsohn was in the State Department's Office
of Legal Advisor. He was a U.S. delegate to several diplomatic confer-
ences involving transportation law, including the 1968 Brussels conference
that adopted the Visby Amendments. Since then, Mr. Mendelsohn has
continued to be actively involved in international transportation law mat-
ters both in private practice and as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
Law School. In addition to Mr. Mendelsohn, the Subcommittee was com-
posed of seven other individuals with wide-ranging knowledge of, and
experience in, almost all aspects of maritime law. They were:
Edward Schmeltzer, Committee Co-Chairman. Former Managing Di-
rector of the FMC. Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 1968 Brussels
Conference on the Visby Amendments. Private law practice, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Lawrence G. Cohen, Maritime Counsel, Exxon Corporation, New York
City.
Wayland Mead, General Counsel, American International Group, Inc.
(AIG), New York City.
Geoffrey V. Parker, Vice President, U.S. Lines, Cranford, New Jersey.
Gordon Paulsen, Past President, United States Maritime Law Associ-
ation (USMLA). Private law practice, New York City.
Stanton P. Sender, Assistant General Counsel, Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
Washington, D.C.
Dewey R. Villareal, Vice Chairman, USMLA Carriage of Goods Com-
mittee. Private law practice, Tampa, Florida.
The subject of shipowner liability to cargo has always been controver-
sial in this country. As a result, the Subcommittee decided at the outset
that it should schedule separate panel sessions, each lasting two to three
hours and each devoted to hearing and discussing the views held by
particular interest groups concerning the issues to be explored by the
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Committee. To that end, the Subcommittee scheduled four separate panel
sessions-the first directed to hearing the views of major container ship-
owners, the second to cargo underwriters, the third to shippers and steve-
dores, and the final session to the U.S. Government. Except for the
stevedores (who declined the Subcommittee's invitation to participate),
each of the various groups was represented by two or three knowledgeable
spokesmen who not only presented their respective points of view but
answered all questions posed by the Subcommittee members. The dis-
cussions were wide-ranging, candid and helpful to all concerned.
When the panel sessions were concluded, the Subcommittee held ad-
ditional meetings to determine if unanimous conclusions and recommen-
dations could be reached. Ultimately, unanimity proved not to be possible,
as the Subcommittee member most clearly identified with shipper interests
decided to submit a Minority Report. A copy of that revised Minority
Report on Behalf of Shipper Interests is annexed hereto.
The Subcommittee's Report and Recommendations and the Minority
Report were considered by the Council of the Section of International
Law during its Spring Meeting from April 23-25, 1987. 5 The various com-
peting interests were invited to appear before the Council and to present
their respective positions, which each did in the course of an extensive
debate. The Subcommittee's position was presented by the Subcommit-
tee's Chairman, accompanied by three Subcommittee members who wished
to underscore their support for the Subcommittee's conclusions and res-
olution. The position of the Section's Admiralty and Maritime Committee
was presented by its Chairman, Glenn Bauer. The position of the U.S.
Maritime Law Association (USMLA) opposing Hamburg Was presented
by Michael M. Cohen. The position of shippers (apart from Exxon Cor-
poration, which opposes Hamburg) was presented by Stanton P. Sender
of Sears, Roebuck and Co. After due consideration of the views of each
of the competing interests, the Council voted to adopt this Report and
Recommendation.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S TRIGGER APPROACH Is NOT YET DEVELOPED
Knowing that carriers and underwriters vigorously oppose Hamburg
while shippers vigorously support Hamburg but oppose Hague/Visby-
the U.S. Government developed a compromise so-called trigger approach.
5. The Subcommittee's Report and Recommendation was substantially similar to this
final Report and Recommendation. However, the Subcommittee also requested that the
U.S. Government call a diplomatic conference to determine whether the four changes to
the Visby/Hague rules should be adopted. (Attached as Appendix A is a draft of four
provisions which would effect these changes by simply revising the Hague/Visby regime at
some future date.) This recommendation was omitted because of a lack of consensus on
how to proceed after Visby.
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Under the trigger, the Senate would give its advice and consent to both
Hague/Visby and Hamburg at the same time. Hague/Visby would enter
into effect immediately, but the effectiveness of Hamburg would not occur
until: (a) more than 20 nations ratify Hamburg and thus it enters into
effect, and (b) more of our trading partners (measured by value of sea-
borne trade) are members of Hamburg than Hague/Visby.
While proposing the trigger approach some three years ago, the Gov-
ernment has taken no recent active steps evidencing continuing support.
Nor has the Executive Branch yet forwarded anything (either Hague/
Visby or- Hamburg or the trigger) to the Senate as part of the initial
ratification process. It may be that, recognizing inherent flaws in the trigger
approach and appreciating the sharp divisions generally within the in-
dustry, the USG has decided for the moment to take a more or less inactive
approach to the problem overall.
B. THE POSITION OF THE SECTION'S ABA ADMIRALTY COMMITTEE
AND THE UNITED STATES MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION (USMLA)
The Section's Admiralty Committee, like the United States Maritime
Law Association (USMLA), supports that position of the resolution call-
ing for the immediate ratificaton of Visby. Neither opposes the remainder
of the resolution. Both oppose Hamburg or any form of trigger mechanism
that could bring Hamburg into effect in the near future. (At one time,
there was some support for the trigger approach among some USMLA
members who viewed it as the only means to obtain Visby. There were
others, however, who viewed the trigger as a means to try to make certain
that Hamburg would never come into effect for the U.S.)
C. THE SHIPPERS' "ALL OR NOTHING" POSITION WILL INDEFINITELY
DELAY ANY PROSPECT OF NEAR TERM IMPROVEMENT
Shippers vigorously support Hamburg and would seem prepared in-
definitely to forego even the three major advances of Visby if they cannot
also get Hamburg promptly. Shippers also are aware that there is some
lingering pro-trigger sentiment that, as indicated above, views the trigger
as a means to try to postpone indefinitely Hamburg's effectiveness for
the U.S. Accordingly, shippers have taken the position that, even if more
of our trading partners do not become Hamburg (rather than Hague/Visby)
members by the end of two years (from the date Visby becomes effective
for the U.S.), the trigger must nevertheless trigger at the end of two years
so that the U.S. will then be a party to Hamburg no matter the status of
our principal trading partners. In addition, while acknowledging that
Hamburg will not preclude carriers from asserting 16 of Hague!Visby's
17 listed defenses, shippers support Hamburg because it will eliminate
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the so-called "nautical fault" defense, i.e., the provision that allows ship-
owners to avoid liability simply by showing that the damage occurred
because their own employees were negligent in the navigation or man-
agement of the vessel. Shippers view this defense as a relic of 19th century
law, wholly unsuited for application today.
Shippers generally (although not Exxon) dissented from the ABA Sub-
committee's Report because: (1) they did not believe that any international
means could be worked out in the near future that would permit expe-
ditious adoption and implementation of the Subcommittee's four rec-
ommendations for additional changes; and (2) they definitely prefer
Hamburg over Visby and believe that if the U.S. ratifies only Visby, this
would more or less send a signal to the world that Hamburg is dead.
D. THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SECTION
FAVORS INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
If the Executive Branch transmits Hamburg to the Senate for ratification
(whether alone or as part of a trigger approach), U.S. shiplines and U.S.
cargo underwriters will certainly oppose it. Because of the certainty of
this opposition, the International Law Section adopted what it considered
to be a viable compromise approach: ratify Visby now (thus giving ship-
pers the immediate benefit of an increased package limit of $840, a new
weight limit of $2.50 per kilo, and the container clause), and simulta-
neously request the U.S. Government to consider four further changes
to the Hague/Visby regime.
Were three of these four changes to be adopted, it would in certain
respects achieve for shippers even more in terms of limits of liability than
they would achieve under Hamburg. The changes would not only raise
the limits to $1,160 per package or $3.50 per kilo (compared to Hamburg's
$1,050 per package and $3.15 per kilo), but would meet the shippers'
demand that the "nautical fault" defense be eliminated. In addition, the
changes include a provision that would achieve one of the principal pur-
poses of the Multimodal Convention, namely, a liability regime for mul-
timodal shipments in instances where it cannot be readily determined on
which mode the loss or damage occurred. Finally, one of the changes
would also meet the stevedores' demand that, whether they be deemed
servants, agents or independent contractors, they be entitled to invoke
the same right to limit liability as is enjoyed by the carriers.
The four changes suggested by the International Law Section, if and
when adopted, could well meet most of the major objectives of shippers
and stevedores, while not engendering any major opposition from carriers
and underwriters. Moreover, it is possible that, if acceptable to the parties,
the changes could be effected well in advance of when Hamburg might
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ever become effective in this country. While it remains disappointing that
most U.S. shippers continue to support Hamburg over the proposed com-
promise, a majority of the International Law Section nevertheless believes
that the proposed compromise furthers the objective of uniformity of law
and is also in the overall best interests of the contending parties and the
U.S. Government.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
There are several reasons why Visby should be ratified promptly. First,
it provides a substantial increase (from $500 to $840) over Hague in the
package limits of liability. Second, it will, for the first time, provide ship-
pers with the choice of either a package limit or a weight limit ($2.50 per
kilo) so that, depending on the nature of the shipment, the shipper can
select whichever limit allows him a greater recovery. Third, it will mean
that, for the first time, U.S. statutory law will provide that it is each
package within a container (not the container itself) that is deemed a
package for purposes of the $840 per package limit. While litigation since
the 1950s has more or less established this conclusion in decisional law
in certain courts, it has yet to be adopted nationwide by statute.
Any approach contemplating the ratification of the Hamburg Rules
(whether or not by way of a trigger) would encounter sustained opposition
from U.S. carriers, U.S. cargo underwriters, and a majority of the USMLA.
Even assuming shippers are correct in arguing that the U.S. is a predom-
inantly shipper-oriented nation and that ratifying Hamburg would ac-
cordingly be in the nation's best long-term interests, it is almost a certainty
that Hamburg could not be ratified without, at the least, a major and
continuing controversy before every Senate and House Committee in-
volved in ratifying the treaty or amending COGSA. This process could
continue indefinitely and might well conclude with no results at all, i.e.,
ratification of neither Hamburg nor Visby.
Even if the process concluded with the ratification of Hamburg, it could
be many years before a total of nineteen other nations ratify and Hamburg
enters into effect. Moreover, informally and otherwise since 1978, the
major maritime nations have demonstrated either a studious lack of in-
terest in Hamburg or, in some instances, open, though diplomatically
expressed, opposition to its adoption in the near term. Attached as Ap-
pendix B is a list of the nations that have so far ratified Hamburg. Also
listed are the nations that have so far ratified Visby or Multimodal.
Several compromise plans were advanced and carefully studied. The
Recommendations in the Resolution were finally adopted. These Rec-
ommendations represent what is believed to be the best present course
of action for the United States. If implemented, they would result in
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immediate U.S. ratification of Visby. They also call upon the U.S. Gov-
ernment to consider other changes to the Hague/Visby regime. If after
consideration, the U.S. Government decides these changes should be
adopted (whether in whole or part), their adoption would work principally
to the advantage of shipper interests, and also to the advantage of the
interests of stevedores.
Finally, it is suggested that, in the meanwhile, the U.S. Government
should continue to consider the provisions of both the Hamburg Rules
and the Multimodal Convention-not only to determine if they are nec-
essary and would substantially benefit shipper interests, but also to assess
the overall impact their ratification would have on the shipping and in-
surance communities in this country and abroad. Careful study of these
issues will help all the parties, government and private, to reach an in-
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Appendix A
Draft Provisions Designed to Implement Fully the
Recommendations of the ABA Subcommittee
1. Article 4, paragraph 5 of the Convention, as amended by the 1968 Pro-
tocol (Visby), shall be amended by deleting the phrase "10,000 francs per
package or unit or 30 francs per kilo of gross weight" and substituting there-
fore "920 SDRs per package or unit or 2.75 SDRs per kilo of gross weight.
2. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Convention, as amended by the 1968
Protocol (Visby), shall be amended by deleting subparagraph (a) and re-
lettering paragraph (b) as (a) and all the following subparagraphs
accordingly.
3. Article 4 of the Convention, as amended by the 1968 Protocol (Visby),
shall be amended by deleting from Article 4 bis, paragraph 2, the par-
enthetical phrase "(such servant or agent not being an independent
contractor)."
4. Article 4 of the Convention, as amended by the 1968 Protocol (Visby),
shall be amended by adding the following paragraph 5 to Article 4 bis:
5. In the event loss or damage occurs to goods that were carried on two
or more different modes of transport, the following rules shall govern:
a. The limits of liability provided for in this Convention shall apply:
(a) where it cannot be proven on which mode of transport the loss
or damage occurred;
(b) where it can be proven on which mode of transport the loss or
damage occurred but the limits of liability applicable to loss or
damage on such mode, whether provided for in an international
convention or in national law, are lower than those provided
for in this Convention.
b. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a shipper from bringing
an action to establish liability under and in accordance with the
provisions of an applicable international convention or national
law where the shipper can prove that the loss or damage occurred
on a particular mode and the international convention or national
law applicable to that mode provides either for no limits of liability
or for limits of liability higher than those in this Convention. Re-
covery under the provisions of such international convention or
national law shall preclude recovery under the provisions of this
Convention.
Appendix B
Adherences as of May, 1986
Nations Adhering Nations Adhering Nations Adhering to
to the Visby to the Hamburg the Multimodal
Amendments Rules Convention
Argentina Barbados Chile
Belgium Chile Malawi
Bermuda Egypt Mexico
Denmark Hungary
East Germany Lebanon
Ecuador Morocco
Egypt Romania
Finland Senegal
France Tanzania
Italy Tunisia
Lebanon Uganda
Liberia
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Singapore
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab
Republic
Tonga
United Kingdom
British Territories
(including
Bermuda,
Gibraltar and
Hong Kong)
Yugoslavia
West Germany (has
adopted the Visby
Amendments in its
domestic law)
